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Abstract
In this paper, we develop and study methods for evaluating forecasters and forecasting
questions in dynamic environments. These methods, based on item response models, are
useful in situations where items vary in difficulty, and we wish to evaluate forecasters based
on the difficulty of the items that they forecasted correctly. Additionally, the methods are
useful in situations where we need to compare forecasters who make predictions at different
points in time or for different items. We first extend traditional models to handle
subjective probabilities, and we then apply a specific model to geo-political forecasts. We
evaluate the model’s ability to accommodate the data, compare the model’s estimates of
forecaster ability to estimates of forecaster ability based on scoring rules, and externally
validate the model’s item estimates. We also highlight some shortcomings of the traditional
models and discuss some further extensions. The analyses illustrate the models’ potential
for widespread use in forecasting and subjective probability evaluation.
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Item Response Models of Probability Judgments: Application to a Geopolitical Forecasting
Tournament
The assessment of forecaster ability is often of interest in applied contexts, especially
when there exist conflicting opinions and we wish to know who to believe. This assessment
is relevant to in applications such as weather forecasting, sports betting, and political
predictions, where the forecasts and the forecasters often exhibit large variability.
In the situation where all forecasters predict the same events at the same point in
time, comparisons are relatively straightforward: one waits for the events to resolve
themselves, then computes an accuracy metric (often a proper scoring rule) for each
forecaster. Forecasters can then be ranked according to their average metric across all
problems, providing information about the forecasters’ relative ability. These metrics have
been traditionally applied to situations where (i) the items are equally “good” at
measuring forecasters’ abilities, (ii) the items are equally difficult for all forecasters, and
(iii) forecasters have responded to the same set of items. Condition (i) is likely violated in
domains involving geopolitical events, where novel forecasting questions must be manually
developed and old questions cannot be re-used. There is no guarantee that the
newly-developed questions are as good (or as bad) as the previously-developed questions.
Condition (ii) is violated when forecasters make judgments at different points in time:
political forecasters may provide predictions of international events at different times,
sports pundits may predict this season’s basketball champion at different points in time,
and so on. When this happens, forecaster ability may be artificially inflated by the easiness
of the forecasted events. For example, a weather forecaster predicting rain for next week
will naturally look worse than a weather forecaster predicting rain for tomorrow. Condition
(iii) is violated in most real applications, where busy forecasters fail to respond to all
inquiries. It is difficult to compare two weather forecasters, one of whom forecasted rain in
Seattle and the other of whom forecasted rain in Phoenix.
When the above three conditions are violated, scoring rules and other traditional
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forecaster assessments fail because they cannot handle items that differ from forecaster to
forecaster. Differing items occur when forecasters have predicted few common items, when
forecasts are reported at different points in time, or when some items are better than
others (for assessing forecaster ability). To address these issues, we adopt a model-based
approach using ideas from item response theory (IRT; Lord & Novick, 1968; Embretson &
Reise, 2000; de Ayala, 2009). IRT methods were originally designed to compare school
students, as opposed to forecasters, on intellectual ability. In this context, overlapping sets
of items are administered to a large number of students. On each item, each student’s
response is coded as either 0 or 1, where 0 means “incorrect” and 1 means “correct”
(though there exist extensions to other types of items). Models arising from IRT then
generally decompose the probability that individual i is correct on item j, pij, into effects
of item difficulty and effects of individual ability. Students’ ability estimates can be
influenced by the specific items that were correctly answered; correct responses can be
weighted by the extent to which the correctly-answered item is diagnostic of ability.
Further, IRT is developed to the point that, even if some individuals answer no common
items, it is still possible to scale them on ability (e.g., Fischer, 1981). This latter feature is
especially applicable to forecasting scenarios, where the forecasted events often vary widely.
While IRT models appear useful for comparing forecasters on ability, the traditional
models are not immediately applicable to forecasting data. This is because traditional IRT
models are fit to binary or ordinal data that reflect whether or not a particular individual
correctly answered a particular item. This differs from forecasting contexts, where
forecasters assign a probability in [0, 1] reflecting their certainty that a particular event
occurs (assuming only two possible outcomes, event occurrence and event non-occurrence).
Once the outcome is known, forecaster accuracy is usually represented by a continuous
number such as the Brier or logarithmic score (e.g., Merkle & Steyvers, 2013; O’Hagan et
al., 2006). Alternatively, components of the Brier score involving calibration or
discrimination are sometimes used (Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, & Phillips, 1982; Yates, 1982).
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Budescu and Johnson (2011) present a model for assessing calibration that is similar in
spirit to the models considered here.
In the pages below, we first formally review some standard IRT models and describe
extensions to probability judgments. Next, we apply these models to geo-political forecasts,
highlighting differences between IRT ability estimates and simple estimates based on
average Brier scores. We also examine out-of-sample model predictions and the model’s
ability to accommodate major data patterns. Finally, we discuss further model issues and
extensions.
Traditional IRT Models and Extensions
As mentioned above, traditional IRT models predict the probability that individual i
is correct on item j, denoted here as pij. One of the simplest models, the Rasch model,
makes this prediction via the equation
logit(pij) = θi − δj, (1)
where θi is the ability of person i and δj is the difficulty of item j. The logit operator,
logit(pij) = log(pij/(1− pij)), ensures that the model’s accuracy predictions (i.e.,
predictions of the pij) are bounded between 0 and 1. According to the model, the chance
that a person is correct depends on her ability relative to item difficulty. If a person’s
ability equals item difficulty, her probability of being correct is .5. Conversely, as a person’s
ability increases (assuming fixed item difficulty), her probability of being correct goes to 1.
Many Rasch model extensions have been proposed (e.g., De Boeck et al., 2011), and
some of the extensions are useful for modeling forecasts. When forecasters make
predictions at different points in time, we must account for the facts that item difficulty
changes over the life of an item and that forecasters may update their forecasts multiple
times for a single item. To handle the “changing item difficulty” feature of the data, a
dynamic Rasch model has been developed (Verhelst & Glas, 1993). This model was
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originally designed to account for feedback effects on multiple-choice tests, whereby
accuracy feedback on previous items impacts one’s accuracy on the current item. In this
context, the Rasch model was extended to include a “number of previous items correct”
covariate. The previous model becomes
logit(pij) = θi − δj + βtij, (2)
where tij is, say, the number of items that subject i has correctly answered when she reaches
item j. In forecasting contexts, tij could instead represent the time at which a forecast is
reported, relative to the time that the item expires. The β parameter describes the extent
to which the subject’s within-test learning impacts item difficulty. This change is nonlinear
on the probability scale, because β is modeled on the logit scale. The β parameter could
possibly be given an i subscript to reflect individual differences in feedback effects
Second, to handle the “forecast update” feature of the data, we need to make some
assumptions about how updated forecasts are influenced by previous forecasts. In the
simplest case, we can assume that item difficulty changes over time and that this fully
accounts for the forecaster’s updated response. In this paper, we generally employ this
simplifying assumption. In a more complex case, we must jointly model the number of
updates and the forecast reported at each update. Some issues underlying the estimation
of these models were considered by Böckenholt (1993). In particular, we may assume that
the frequency of forecast updates is impacted by the forecaster and/or by the item, and
that a forecaster’s updated forecast is dependent on her previous forecast. The models that
we describe below could potentially be extended in these manners.
Now that we have discussed some traditional IRT models and extensions, we discuss
novel model extensions to handle probability judgments.
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IRT Models of Probability Judgments
A key feature of probability judgments involves the fact that they are bounded from
below by 0 and from above by 1. There exists some previous work on IRT models for these
types of doubly bounded data, initiated by Samejima (1973) and applied/refined by a small
number of others (Bejar, 1977; Ferrando, 2001; Müller, 1987; Muthén, 1989; Noel &
Dauvier, 2007). The recent work of Noel and Dauvier (2007) is notable because it employs
a beta-distributed likelihood, whereas the others employ logit- or probit-normal likelihoods.
We take an approach that has similarities to Samejima, in that we first transform the
probability judgments to be unbounded, then fit a model with normally-distributed error
(i.e., a one-factor model) to the transformed data. Once this model has been estimated, the
parameter estimates can be transformed to IRT parameter estimates using theory that
connects factor analysis models to IRT models (Takane & de Leeuw, 1987). This allows us
to extract parameter estimates that have simple interpretations.
Model Conceptualization
We generally fit models to respondent i’s probit-transformed forecast for item j,
denoted Y ∗ij . This is essentially equivalent to the logit transformation described above (e.g.,
McDonald, 1999). We assume there are exactly two possible outcomes for each item, and
that Y ∗ij always holds respondent i’s forecast associated with the realized outcome (so that
larger forecasts are always better).
The models that we estimate are variants of a traditional, one-factor model. As
further described later, these models are highly related to the IRT models described in the
previous section. Assuming J items and I forecasts, a preliminary model may be written as
y∗ij = µj + λjθi + eij i = 1, . . . , I; j = 1, . . . , J, (3)
where y∗ij is individual i’s observed, probit-transformed forecast on item j, µj is the mean
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forecast for item j, θi is respondent i’s ability, λj reflects the extent to which ability is
useful on item j, and eij is the residual associated with individual i’s forecast on item j.
Because larger forecasts are always better, the µ parameters are related to item easiness:
larger values of µ reflect easier items, and smaller values of µ reflect harder items. As is
standard for factor models, we further assume that
θi ∼ N(0, 1) (4)
eij ∼ N(0, ψ−1j ), (5)
where the θi and eij are assumed independent. The fixed mean and variance on the
hyperdistribution of the θi act as identification constraints; these parameters are undefined
because the θi parameters are unobserved, so that the fixed mean and variance “set the
scale” for the θi. As further described in the “Model Estimation and Use” section, the
variance of 1 is enforced on each iteration of the MCMC algorithm through a parameter
expansion technique.
A variant of the above model allows time to have an impact on difficulty:
y∗ij = b0j + (b1j − b0j) exp(−b2tij) + λjθi + eij, (6)
where tij is the time at which individual i forecasted item j (measured as days until the
item expires), b0j reflects item j’s easiness as days to item expiration goes to infinity, b1j
reflects item j’s easiness at the time the item resolves (i.e., the item’s “irreducible
uncertainty”), and b2 describes the change in item easiness over time. This exponential
function is advantageous in that its parameter interpretations are meaningful to
practitioners, but many others could be conceptualized. A linear function of time is simpler
and still allows for nonlinear change in probabilistic forecasts over time (because the linear
equation is on the probit scale). Alternatively, autoregressive/moving average functions
may help account for autocorrelation in forecasts over time.
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For stability in model estimation, the tij from Equation (6) are scaled so that the
values stay relatively close to zero. While this scaling can ease model estimation, it can
also make it more difficult to accurately estimate the b0 parameters (because the scaling
leads to few data points with large, negative values of tij). We have still found the scaling
to be useful, however, because fast model convergence has been more important to us than
the accuracy of b0 estimates.
The above model assigns four unique parameters to each item: two item easiness
parameters b0 and b1, a loading λ, and an error variance ψ. We could also allow b2 to be
unique to each item, though experience has indicated that this is not necessarily helpful
(further discussion on this point later). Regardless of this issue, the model parameters can
be transformed to IRT parameters using theoretical results on the equivalence between
factor models and item response models (e.g., Takane & de Leeuw, 1987). In effect, the
probit forecasts y∗ij are treated as latent variables giving rise to the binary outcomes
associated with item resolution. The parameter transformations are useful for
interpretation purposes, whereby one wishes to describe items via their difficulty and
discrimination rather than the four parameters from the factor model.
To convert the factor model parameter estimates to item response estimates, we take
(Takane & de Leeuw, 1987)
γ0j = b0jψ−1/2j (7)
γ1j = b1jψ−1/2j (8)
γj = b0j + (b1j − b0j) exp(−b2tij) (9)
αj = λjψ−1/2j , (10)
with the ability estimates θi remaining unchanged. Equation (9) assumes a fixed timepoint
tij, so that the equation is related to item j’s difficulty at the time individual i provided a
forecast. These transformed parameters then correspond to a two-parameter IRT model
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(i.e., two unique parameters per item) for binary outcomes yij:
yij ∼ Bernoulli(pij) (11)
probit(pij) = γj + αjθi, (12)
where, as just mentioned, γj is related to item j’s easiness at time tij and αj is the extent
to which item j discriminates between forecasters of different ability. These transformed
parameters provide no more information than the original, factor analysis parameters.
However, as mentioned above, the transformed parameters’ interpretations are
advantageous for forecasting situations. Additionally, the parameter transformations
illustrate that previous IRT model extensions are relevant to the modeling of forecasting
data.
We now mention some additional issues before moving to model estimation. First, as
shown in Equation (4), the person ability parameter θi is typically treated as a random
effect. Therefore, these parameters are not typically estimated using ML methods but can
be obtained via, e.g., regression-based methods or Bayesian methods (we use the latter
below). Second, while the models outlined above are related to the traditional, 2-parameter
IRT model, we can also obtain a Rasch-like model as a special case (using a probit, as
opposed to a logit, link function). This is generally accomplished by restricting the λj to
all be equal and the ψj to all be equal.
Finally, we can define some simpler models that are useful for model comparison.
These models include only item effects or only forecaster effects:
y∗ij = bj + eij (13)
y∗ij = θi + eij, (14)
where the top equation includes fixed item effects and the bottom equation includes fixed
forecaster effects (and the residual in both equations follows a N(0, σ2e) distribution).
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These models can be easily estimated via standard regression or ANOVA methods.
Model Estimation and Use
Estimation of the above models is handled via Bayesian methods. In the analyses
below, we generally fit Bayesian versions of the model from (6) via MCMC, transforming
the resulting parameters to IRT parameters via Equations (7) to (10). JAGS code
(Plummer, 2003) for model estimation is provided as supplemental material to this article.
To improve chain mixing and convergence, we use the parameter expansion technique
described by Ghosh and Dunson (2009). In short, we sample from a model with
unidentified λ and θ parameters. At each sampling iteration, we transform these
unidentified parameters to a unique solution. The unidentified parameters, which we
denote λ∗ and θ∗, have prior distributions of
λ∗j ∼ N(0, 1) ∀ j (15)
θ∗i ∼ N(0, φ−1) ∀ i (16)
φ−1 ∼ Gamma(.01, .01). (17)
These sampled parameters are then transformed to the desired model parameters via
λj = sign(λ∗1)λ∗jφ−1/2 (18)
θi = sign(λ∗1)φ1/2θ∗i , (19)
where sign(λ∗1) equals either 1 or −1, depending on whether λ∗1 is positive or negative.
Other model parameters are not involved in the parameter expansion approach. They
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receive priors of
b0j ∼ N(0, .5) ∀ j (20)
b1j ∼ N(0, .5) ∀ j (21)
b2 ∼ N(0, .5) (22)
ψj ∼ Inv-Gamma(.01, .01) ∀ j, (23)
where the normal distributions are parameterized with precisions, as opposed to variances.
In the analyses below, the priors on the bs appear to have little impact on the outcomes
unless the precision terms are very small. In that case, parameter convergence sometimes
fails when forecasts associated with an item become extreme (close to 0 or 1). This is
because the model parameters are operating on the probit scale, where they can stray
towards −∞ or +∞.
To monitor convergence, we use time series plots and the Gelman-Rubin statistic
(Gelman & Rubin, 1992). Throughout the analyses below, these statistics always indicate
that the model parameters converge to the posterior distribution. Missing data are assumed
to be missing at random (e.g., Little & Rubin, 2002), so that the missingness mechanism
can be ignored. This assumption is generally valid here (described further below) but is not
likely to be valid in all applications. We expand on this issue in the General Discussion.
Application: Geo-political Forecasts
To study the model’s application to real data, we used geopolitical forecasts collected
from September, 2011 to April, 2013 as part of a forecasting tournament. The tournament
included five university-based teams and was sponsored by the Intelligence Advanced
Research Projects Activity. The forecasts used here arise from the team that won the
tournament.
IRT OF PROBABILITIES 14
Methods
1,593 national and international participants submitted probability judgments
associated with 199 questions on the goodjudgmentproject.com web site. Participants
were randomly assigned to different conditions (involving whether or not they received
probability training and whether or not they worked in groups), and they were encouraged
to forecast as many questions as possible over time. Further details on the data collection
methods can be found in Mellers et al. (2014).
In the current paper, we focus on a subset of the full dataset: 241 participants who
responded to nearly all of 133 two-alternative forecasting questions. We chose this subset
because we expected it to yield the most reliable results. In particular, because these
subjects forecasted nearly all of the questions, they have the most experience and should
therefore have the most stable ability levels. Additionally, we focused on two-alternative
questions for ease in modeling: while questions with more than two alternatives could be
incorporated into the model, these questions may differ from the others in difficulty or in
response strategies. We wished to avoid this heterogeneity. Finally, the focus on
participants who responded to nearly all the questions helped us to avoid complicated
missing data issues. In particular, it is unlikely that the full dataset fulfills the missing at
random assumption (e.g., Little & Rubin, 2002) that is commonly employed. While
reliance on frequent forecasters solves the missing data issues, it also creates a selection
effect: the frequent forecasters undoubtedly differ from infrequent forecasters, so that
parameter estimates are likely to change if we included infrequent forecasters.
In the following sections, we first examine the model’s predictive ability. In
traditional IRT contexts, such an examination is complicated by the facts that (i) the
observed data consist of only 0s and 1s, and (ii) traditional estimation methods (e.g.,
marginal ML) do not directly estimate the θ parameters. However, study of out-of-sample
predictions is straightforward in the current, Bayesian context.
Following the examination of predictions, we compare the models’ estimates of
IRT OF PROBABILITIES 15
forecaster ability to the average Brier score, which is often used as a metric of forecaster
ability. After making a general comparison, we further examine the precision of ability
estimates when a small number of items have been forecasted. Finally, we use the IRT
models to study the impact of time and of item covariates on item difficulty.
Out-of-Sample Predictions
There are many ways to study the model’s ability to accommodate the observed data,
including posterior predictive checks, residual analyses, and out-of-sample predictions. We
focus on the latter option here, randomly deleting 30% of the forecasts from the original
dataset. Following this deletion, there still exists some data from each item and each judge.
These data are used to fit the model from Equation (6), obtaining estimates of γ and α for
each item and of θ for each judge (see Equation (12)). The estimates are then used to
predict the deleted forecasts, allowing us to compare the predictions to the observed,
held-out data.
Results. Figure 1 displays observed forecasts (x-axis) vs out-of-sample model
predictions (y-axis), both of which are probit transformed. The right panel displays
predictions for the IRT model described previously, while the other panels display
predictions for the “fixed item effects only” model (Equation (13)) and the “fixed user
effects only” model (Equation (14)). This figure displays both some successes and
shortcomings of the IRT model. Focusing on successes, we see a general positive trend in
the right panel, with a correlation of 0.66 between observed and predicted forecasts. This
implies an R2 of 0.43. In contrast, the model that only includes effects of items (and not of
forecasters or time) has an R2 around 0.15, and the model that only includes effects of
forecasters (and not of items or time) has an R2 of about 0.05. Thus, we can conclude that
the dynamic IRT model is making better predictions than simpler counterparts.
Focusing on shortcomings, the model predictions appear to be worst for probit
forecasts around -3 or 3, which correspond to probabilistic forecasts of 0 or 1. This
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partially reflects the fact that forecasters over-use forecasts of 0 or 1 because these forecasts
have clear verbal interpretations (see, e.g., Fischhoff & Bruine de Bruin, 1999). Relatedly,
the model predictions have a lower bound around -2, which corresponds to a probability of
about .12. This means that forecasters are never predicted to provide incorrect, extreme
forecasts. Later in the paper, we consider some model extensions to address these issues.
To further examine the model’s fit, Figure 2 displays residual plots of model
predictions (out of sample) by item and by forecaster, respectively. The x-axes contain
item and forecaster IDs, which are ordered by average Brier score (the user/item with best
Brier score has ID 1, and higher IDs reflect users/items with worse Brier scores). The
forecaster plot indicates some heteroscedasticity, with points on the right side having
greater variability than points on the left side. Additionally, some outlying negative
residuals appear in both plots. These come from situations where the forecaster assigned
probabilities near zero to the realized outcome; these issues are further incantations of the
previously-discussed issue associated with model predictions.
Ability Estimates
The previous section examined out-of-sample model predictions using a
partially-deleted dataset. In this section, we fit the same model to the full dataset and to
small numbers of items. We generally compare model-based ability estimates to Brier
scores, as the Brier score is often the default forecaster evaluation metric in practice. The
Brier score weights each item equally, however, which may be suboptimal in forecasting
environments. The item response model, on the other hand, differentially weights items
depending on the extent to which they discriminate forecasters of different abilities. The
prior distributions used to estimate the models were the same as the prior distributions
used in the previous section.
Full Data Estimates. Figure 3 compares model-based ability estimates to mean
Brier scores for the 241 forecasters in the data. There is a clear relationship between the
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two metrics, with a Spearman correlation of −0.43 (the correlation is negative because
larger Brier scores are bad, while larger ability estimates are good). The model-based
ability estimates are more closely related to each forecaster’s median Brier score (not
shown), with a Spearman correlation of −0.84. Use of the median Brier score diminishes
the impact of bad forecasts, so this strong correlation implies that the model also exhibits
a diminished impact of bad forecasts.
In addition to the above, we examined the relationship between the model-based
ability estimates and mean standardized Brier scores (i.e., Brier scores converted to
z-scores on an item-by-item basis). The standardized Brier score is a heuristic method for
adjusting scores based on item difficulty; a forecaster with a bad Brier score can still get a
good standardized score if her prediction was better than the crowd. We expected that the
standardized Brier scores be more similar to the IRT estimates because they are both
relative measures. Nonetheless, the scatter plot (not pictured) looks similar to Figure 3,
with the Spearman correlation between standardized Brier scores and model-based
estimates being −0.59.
To further study relationships between the ability metrics, we identified four
individuals in Figure 3 for closer comparison. The first two individuals are the person with
the best Brier score (red plus) and the person with the best IRT-based ability estimate
(red X). We also selected two individuals who are related to these first two: the person who
is most similar to the best Brier score on ability while being most dissimilar on Brier score
(black plus), and the person who is most similar to the best ability estimate on Brier score
while being most dissimilar on ability (black X). We plotted these individuals’ forecasts to
examine their response styles and the items for which they provided good/bad forecasts.
These plots are displayed in Figure 4; the x-axis displays item IDs (ordered by mean Brier
score), while the y-axis displays the Brier score that each person obtained for each item.
The top row displays plots for the “plusses” (similar ability estimates, dissimilar Brier
scores), while the bottom row displays plots for the “Xs” (similar Brier scores, dissimilar
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ability estimates). Points are shaded to represent the time at which they were made;
lighter points represent forecasts that were made closer to event resolution.
Comparing the two panels in the top row, we see that the individuals arrived at
similar IRT ability estimates in different manners. The person in the left panel generally
made good forecasts up to item 100 (approximately), then made bad forecasts. In contrast,
the person in the right panel generally made some bad forecasts across the full range of
items, but the bad forecasts were often made far from event resolution (i.e., many points
are dark). The IRT model takes into account the time at which each forecast is made,
which resulted in the similar ability estimates assigned to these two individuals. This
reflects a major advantage of the model-based estimates: they allow us to account for time
of reported forecast.
Comparing the two panels in the bottom row, we see that the IRT model rewarded
the individual on the left who generally made extreme forecasts. The person on the right,
on the other hand, generally reported forecasts closer to .5, which resulted in a lower
ability estimate. Comparison of the two panels in the left column reinforces these ideas: we
see that the person with the best Brier score (top left panel) avoided extreme errors,
whereby one assigns a probability of 1 to the incorrect outcome. However, the person also
made less-extreme judgments when she was uncertain, and she had particular trouble with
the most difficult items (as measured by the Brier score; those on the far right side of the
graph). In contrast, the person with the best ability estimate (bottom left panel) used
extreme judgments and often made a perfect forecast on the most difficult items. The
model therefore rewarded this person for usually making perfect forecasts, even for many
difficult items. As compared to the Brier score, we see that the model rewards correct,
extreme judgments and lightly penalizes incorrect, extreme judgments. In short, the model
rewards forecasters who are willing to take risks, while the Brier score rewards forecasters
who are more conservative. While different decision makers will value different types of
forecasters, we found the model’s handling of extreme forecasts to be appealing. In the
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General Discussion, we provide further thoughts about model-based ability estimates and
proper scoring rules.
Estimates from Few Items. Are the IRT ability estimates related to future
performance on unseen items? To answer this question, we created a scenario where we
observe a small number of forecasts from a small group of individuals (and many forecasts
from a large group of individuals). We estimate the ability of the small group via IRT
models and Brier scores. We then examine whether the small group’s ability estimates are
related to their ability estimates from a separate set of test forecasts.
In this analysis, we partitioned the original data to create twenty sets of training and
test data. Within each set, the training data were comprised of all forecasts from 90% of
forecasters and ten randomly-chosen forecasts from the remaining 10% of forecasters (the
“test” forecasters). Using the training data, we measured the test forecasters’ abilities via
three methods: mean Brier score, mean standardized Brier score (described in the previous
section), and the IRT model (Equation (6)).
After obtaining ability estimates with the training data, we used the test data to
re-estimate test forecasters’ abilities. The test data included 66 new forecasts from the test
forecasters and all forecasts from the other forecasters. This analysis was set up to mimic
applied situations where we have large amounts of data on some forecasters, and we wish
to accurately measure new forecasters’ abilities using small amounts of data (here, ten
forecasts).
The results are most efficiently described via Spearman correlations between each
training measure and its test measure. These results are displayed in Table 1, containing
the mean correlation (with interquartile ranges) across the twenty replications. We
generally observe greater consistency in the IRT ability measures from the training to the
test set, as compared to the Brier scores. In particular, the mean correlation between
training and test Brier scores is .48; between training and test standardized Brier scores is
.59; and between training and test IRT estimates is .73. While the intervals associated with
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each measure overlap, the ordering is consistent across all twenty replications: the IRT
estimates always exhibit the largest correlation, followed by the standardized Brier scores,
followed by the regular Brier scores.
These results suggest that, when a forecaster provides only a small number of
forecasts, the IRT model provides an ability estimate that better generalizes to future IRT
ability estimates. This is because the IRT model has two advantages over the Brier score:
it can account for the time at which a forecast was made, and it uses information about all
forecasters in assigning an ability estimate to any single forecaster. The former advantage
can help the model handle incorrect, long-term forecasts; a forecaster’s ability estimate is
not penalized as much if he/she makes a bad forecast at a time when the item is difficult.
The latter advantage can help the model account for item difficulty; it lightly penalizes bad
forecasts on items that are difficult for everyone, and it heavily penalizes bad forecasts on
items that are easy. While standardized Brier scores address the latter advantage, they do
not address the former advantage.
Relation of Model Parameters to Covariates
Finally, we examine covariates both within and outside the model. We first examine
the estimated impact of time on item difficulty. We then examine the extent to which the
estimated item parameters are related to external ratings of item “surprisingness.”
Effects of Time. In comparing the b0 and b1 estimates associated with each item,
we found that b1 > b0 for all but one item. Because b1 represents easiness at item resolution
and b0 represents easiness as days to resolution go to ∞, this implies that items usually
become easier over time. In Figure 5, we graph the estimated effect of time on item
easiness for three randomly-selected items. As we move from left to right in the figure, we
get closer to event resolution.
It is seen that, at 80 days before item resolution, the item represented by the solid
(dashed) line is easiest (hardest). These difficulties change differentially over time, so that,
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around 30 days before item resolution, the dashed line is no longer the most difficult.
Finally, near 0 days before resolution, the solid and dashed lines converge. The items that
varied greatly in easiness around 80 days to resolution have now become equally easy.
These results show that the model estimates support our intuition of items becoming
easier over time. Additionally, they illustrate why we employ a b2 parameter that is fixed
across items: the b0 and b1 parameters specify the magnitude of change in item difficulty
over time, which in turn influences the speed at which items change. We do not need an
additional, item-specific b2 parameter to obtain different rates of change across items.
Relation to External Covariates. We also compared the model’s estimated
parameters to an external variable: the extent to which the outcome of each item was
surprising. After each item resolved (i.e., ex post), surprisingness was rated by two subject
matter experts (who did not create the items) on a scale from 0–10, where 10 means “most
surprising” and 0 means “least surprising.” An item was given a high rating if its outcome
would have been surprising to an informed observer at the time the item was intially
created (when the outcome was unknown). Ratings were averaged across the two raters for
the analyses here.
Model parameters for comparison included each item’s easiness (γ1), discrimination
(α), and residual variability (ψ). Surprising items should be related to these parameters:
items whose outcomes are surprising may be more difficult, they may fail to discriminate
between forecasters of differing abilities, and they may induce greater residual variability.
Therefore, if the model’s item estimates match reality, they should be related to the
external ratings.
Figure 6 displays scatterplots between the model’s item estimates and the external
ratings (below the main diagonal), with correlations between each pair of variables
appearing above the main diagonal. Focusing on the signs of model parameters’
correlations with surprise ratings, we see that less-surprising items are easier, discriminate
better between forecasters of different ability, and have lower residual variability. The
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magnitudes of these correlations are relatively small, being −.09 (easiness), −.26
(discrimination), and .14 (residual variability). The previously-discussed model
shortcomings likely dampen the correlations, as well as the residual variability in the
ratings of surprisingness. Overall, however, the correlations between item parameters and
the external variable are in the expected directions and provide further evidence that the
model is capturing the data in a meaningful way.
Model Evaluation Summary
In summary, the model predictions are reasonably accurate, and the model parameter
estimates correspond to our expectations about their behavior (as illustrated through the
relationship with external variables). The main weakness of the model lies in its inability
to accommodate incorrect, extreme forecasts. The model is also unable to account for the
over-use of forecasts of .5. These issues are potentially addressed via an item response
model of ordinal judgments, which is studied in the next section.
Ordinal Model
As developed thus far, the IRT model does a poor job of handling the extreme
forecasts of 0 and 1. Furthermore, the model cannot handle the overuse of .5 that is
commonly observed in many datasets (Bruine de Bruin, Fischhoff, Millstein, &
Halpern-Felsher, 2000). To handle these issues, multiple model alterations are possible.
The alteration that we consider in detail here (with others being described in the General
Discussion) involves treating the reported forecasts as ordered categories instead of as
continuous judgments. This mimics the manner by which confidence judgments are
typically collected and modeled in cognitive psychology tasks (Pleskac & Busemeyer, 2010;
Ratcliff & Starns, 2009; Van Zandt, 2000). For example, in recognition memory
experiments, subjects must report whether or not a focal word appeared on a previous list
of words. Their confidence is not typically reported on a continuous scale; instead it may
be reported on a 6-category scale ranging from “certain the word previously appeared” to
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“certain the word did not appear.” The rationale for this scale is that subjects can only
discriminate between a small number of confidence levels (say, uncertain, somewhat
certain, and certain). This implies that geopolitical forecasts of, e.g., .2 and .4 might be
treated equivalently because forecasters have no cognitive basis for discriminating between
such judgments.
Model Detail and Method
The model described here is an ordinal version of the continuous model that we
described previously. We assume a continuous, latent variable that drives the judgments
Y ∗. This variable is similar to the probit-transformed forecasts used previously, except that
the variable is now unobserved. Multiple threshold parameters determine the reported,
ordinal category. The model employs ideas related to the graded response model that is
popular in psychometrics (Samejima, 1969, 1997), the signal detection models that are
popular in cognitive science (DeCarlo, Kim, & Johnson, 2011; Wickens, 2002), and the
proportional odds model that is popular in statistics (Fullerton, 2009; McCullagh, 1980).
The thresholds change over time in the current application, reflecting the fact that problem
difficulty tends to change over time.
Formally, we define the latent variable as
y∗ij = λjθi + eij, (24)
where the eij and the θi arise from separate standard normal distributions. Assuming m
ordered categories, we then compute (M − 1) threshold parameters via the equation
qjm = b0jm + (b1j − b0jm) exp(−b2tij) m = 1, . . . , (M − 1), (25)
where the bs are free parameters, tij was defined previously (as time until the problem
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resolves), and b0j1 < b0j2 < . . . < b0j(M−1). The observed response yij is then determined via
yij =

1 if y∗ij < qj1
2 if y∗ij > qj1 and y∗ij < qj2
...
M if y∗ij > qj(M−1).
(26)
This model can also be written via probit-transformed, cumulative probabilities of
responding to each category or below; further detail on the multiple ways of writing these
models is provided by Smithson and Merkle (2013).
We fit the model to the full dataset used earlier in the paper, with M = 5:
probability judgments of 0 were coded as category 1, probability judgments in [.01, .49]
were category 2, .5 was category 3, [.51, .99] was category 4, and 1 was category 5. This
coding collapses away much information, and codings for larger values of M could be
conceptualized. We were interested in the extent to which forecaster ability estimates
differed when treating the forecasts as ordered categories, as compared to continuous
judgments. This comparison provides information about the extent to which the original
model’s (mis)handling of extreme forecasts impacts ability estimates, as well as the extent
to which continuous forecasts are more useful than categorical forecasts. Prior distributions
on model parameters were the same as those used for the original model.
Results
A scatter plot of forecaster ability under the continuous model (x-axis) and under the
ordinal model (y-axis) is displayed in Figure 7. This illustrates a surprisingly-strong
correlation of 0.87 between the models’ ability estimates, with the best forecasters being
especially similar across the models. The low-ability forecasters exhibit greater variability
between models, and this is likely related to the original model’s problems with incorrect,
extreme judgments: bad forecasters provide more of these judgments, so that the resulting
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ability estimates diverge.
The similarity between the two models’ ability estimates provides interesting results
about the original model and about the forecasters. Focusing on the former, the results
imply that the original model’s shortcomings involving extreme judgments do not have a
large impact on the resulting ability estimates. Focusing on forecasters, it was surprising
that results remained similar when we discard a large amount of data; when all continuous
judgments from .01 to .49 (and from .51 to .99) are collapsed into a single category. While
this implies that it may be sufficient to elicit forecasts on an ordinal, as opposed to
continuous scale, ordinal scales may induce other problems. First, the optimal number of
ordered categories (M) to use in any particular application is unclear, and fixing M to a
small value may be too restrictive in some applications. A forecaster may report a
“certain” judgment on one item, then encounter a new item for which she is more certain
than she was on the original item. Second, the use of ordered categories may disallow base
rate information that is important for some geopolitical items. For example, items
involving elections may benefit from polling data, results of similar elections, and so on.
This information may yield a quantitative estimate that is more precise than an ordered
category, and the forecaster may use this estimate as a prior probability for judging the
focal election. Forcing the forecaster to use an ordered category may not allow the
forecaster to communicate all of her knowledge.
General Discussion
In this paper, we first tailored item response models to probability judgments. These
models can handle many issues that traditional forecast evaluation methods cannot,
including the facts that (i) forecasters forecast the same item at different points in time,
(ii) forecasters forecast different subsets of items, and (iii) items differ in the extent to
which they measure ability. Therefore, the models offer novel methods for evaluating
forecasters and questions in realistic situations. In fitting the models to data from a
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geo-political forecasting tournament, we empirically observed both strengths and
weaknesses of the models. Strengths included the facts that the model’s out-of-sample
predictions were reasonable and that the model’s item estimates were related to external
measures of item closeness and surprisingness. Weaknesses were related to extreme,
incorrect forecasts: the model could not accommodate these forecasts, and it may not
adequately penalize forecasters who were frequently extreme and incorrect. In the sections
below, we describe extensions to handle these and other issues. These extensions are
related to extreme forecasts, “proper” ability estimates, item evaluation, missing data, and
dimensionality of forecaster ability. We also consider some methodological issues involved
in the evaluation of probability judgments.
Extreme forecasts
As described previously, we implemented an ordinal model to address the original
model’s inability to accommodate extreme forecasts (and overuse of .5). While the ordinal
model handled extreme forecasts, it was unsatisfactory from the standpoint that data were
being discarded (i.e., many distinct forecasts were collapsed into a single category). It may
instead be worthwhile to consider alternative models that treat the forecasts as continuous
while simultaneously accounting for overuse of forecasts in {0, .5, 1}. One alternative
involves development of a two-component mixture model that can handle overuse of
particular forecasts, which is related to the traditional three-parameter item response
models (Birnbaum, 1968). The traditional model assumes that individuals sometimes
respond correctly by guessing, regardless of their ability. In a forecasting mixture model,
we might instead assume that forecasters sometimes provide judgments of 0, .5, or 1 that
are unrelated to the specific question’s difficulty or to the specific forecaster’s ability. There
are likely to be estimation difficulties associated with this model due to the parameter
identification issues inherent in mixture models (see Smithson, Merkle, & Verkuilen, 2011,
for a general discussion of mixture models for probability judgments).
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Other researchers have addressed overuse of forecasts through rounding or through
modified link functions. For example, Kleinjans and Van Soest (2014) develop a model
whereby subjects arrive at probability judgments through various types of rounding. A
judgment of, say, .07 implies that the subject’s true belief lies somewhere between .065 and
.075; her judgment is rounded to the nearest multiple of .01. An extreme judgment of 1,
however, may be obtained through other types of rounding: the subject may be rounding
to the nearest multiple of .1, so that the judgment of 1 merely implies that her true belief
is greater than .95. The overuse of {0, .5, 1} arises because subjects can arrive at these
judgments through multiple types of rounding (to the nearest multiple of .01, .05, .1, .25,
or .5). These multiple types of rounding lead to a five-component mixture model, which
makes it challenging to implement rounding within the model proposed here.
Related to rounding, others have employed truncated or censored distributions to
account for the extreme judgments of 0 and 1. Muthén (1989) uses a censored model to
handle extreme judgments, whereby all judgments that are more extreme than the
censoring point simply assume an extreme value of 0 or 1. Ferrando (2001) relatedly
describes use of a truncated normal distribution to model bounded responses (such as
probability judgments), using an identity link function instead of the logit or probit.
Neither of these models immediately handle the abundance of .5 judgments, though
additional censoring points may be employed to handle these judgments.
Proper ability estimates
Scoring metrics such as the Brier score or logarithmic score are popular in forecasting
contexts because they are proper: forecasters can expect to receive the best score when
their forecasts match the true probability of event occurrence. This, in turn, is thought to
motivate forecasters to be honest; to report their honest belief about the probability of
event occurrence.
The model-based ability metric proposed in this paper (from the IRT model of
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continuous judgments) is not proper. For a traditional, two-parameter IRT model applied
to binary data, the sufficient statistic for ability (θi) is
∑
j αjyij, where αj is item j’s
discrimination and yij indicates whether or not subject i correctly answered item j (e.g.,
Baker & Kim, 2004). Translating these results to the current model (in Equation (6)), we
can show that the sufficient statistic for θi involves a weighted sum of the y∗ij. This
amounts to an “absolute error” metric, which encourages reporting of a median judgment
instead of a mean judgment (Gneiting, 2011). That is, assuming one’s uncertainty about
the forecast is represented by a probability distribution, then the proposed model
encourages reporting of that distribution’s median instead of the mean. Models whose
ability estimates are related to the Brier score or to other proper scoring rules require
further study, but the inclusion of specific scoring rules into traditional IRT models has
recently been considered by Bo, Lewis, and Budescu (2015).
Item attributes
In traditional IRT applications, models provide estimates of item attributes (typically
difficulty and discrimination) in addition to estimates of respondents’ ability. The item
attributes are especially useful because the items can be re-used: we can administer test
items to an initial group of students, then select the best items for wide-scale
administration. This is different from many forecasting situations, where, once we know an
item’s outcome, the item is expired and cannot be reused. As a result, we cannot
immediately use IRT models to pre-determine which items are of suitable difficulty.
Instead, we could extend the models to include additional item covariates that are related
to difficulty (e.g., De Boeck & Wilson, 2004). This would allow us to estimate the impact
of covariates on item difficulty, providing information about the relative difficulty of
different item types.
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Missing data
Many forecasting scenarios lead to large amounts of missing data: forecasters may
respond to only a small proportion of items, new forecasters may enter the panel, and old
forecasters may leave the panel. In the current paper, we bypassed these issues by
examining a subset of frequent forecasters. Here, we consider some model extensions to
handle the missing data issues.
Focusing on forecasters who respond to a small proportion of items, it is easiest to
ignore the missing data points and model only the observed data. This amounts to
assuming that the data are missing at random (e.g., Little & Rubin, 2002), an assumption
that can be violated if, e.g., the good forecasters are able to select easy questions. When
this assumption is violated (so that the data are missing not at random), then we must
simultaneously model the reported forecasts and a binary variable denoting whether or not
each forecaster responded to each item. The approach of O’Muircheartaigh and Moustaki
(1999) appears promising for accomplishing this. Their approach involves a
two-dimensional ability model, where the first dimension is forecaster ability and enters the
model in the same way as the model used in the current paper. The second dimension is
then “response propensity,” and it is used to model the binary response data (indicating
whether or not a forecaster responded to an item). Importantly, this second dimension also
influences the reported forecasts, which allows for situations where the reported forecasts
are related to item selection. This approach is an extension of the model reported in this
paper and can potentially be estimated via Bayesian methods.
The situation where new forecasters enter and old forecasters leave can be addressed
via linking and equating methods that have been thoroughly studied in traditional IRT
contexts (e.g., von Davier, 2013). In short, these methods allow us to place forecasters’
abilities on a common scale even when different forecasters respond to different items. To
do so, there is typically a requirement that either (i) everyone has responded to at least one
common item, or (ii) some people have responded to all items. These requirements may be
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partially relaxed, however, for situations where each person potentially responds to a
unique subset of items. Fischer (1981) describes necessary and sufficient conditions under
which the Rasch model can be fit to these types of incomplete data. Importantly, responses
must be “connected,” in the (rough) sense that each person’s chosen items must overlap
with other people’s chosen items. For forecasting contexts, it is perhaps safest to present
incoming forecasters with some practice items to which everyone has responded.
Alternatively, if there are a subset of committed forecasters who respond to all items, then
this should be sufficient to employ the methods described here.
Dimensionality of ability
The IRT models described in this paper assume that ability is unidimensional; that
each forecaster’s ability can be described by a single number. In the previous section, we
discussed adding a dimension to accommodate missing data issues. We could more
generally assume multiple dimensions of forecasting ability, where different dimensions
reflect different types of ability. For example, one dimension might reflect ability to make
long-term estimates, a second dimension might reflect subject-matter knowledge, and so
on. These models are increasingly difficult to fit as the number of dimensions increase.
Additionally, the dimensions may be modeled as either compensatory or non-compensatory.
In the former case, low ability on one dimension can be offset by high ability on another
dimension. In the latter case, one must have high ability on all relevant dimensions in
order to exhibit good performance. These extensions, along with the previous extensions to
address model shortcomings, may lead to important advances in forecast assessment.
Further work is needed to ensure that these complex models can be reliably estimated in
general forecasting situations.
Methodological issues
Finally, we remark on some issues surrounding the statistical analysis of probability
judgments. Previous researchers (Erev, Wallsten, & Budescu, 1994; Wallsten, 1996) have
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noted that different probability judgment analysis methods can lead to conflicting
conclusions about the judges/forecasters. These researchers have focused on calibration,
which is the correspondence between the probability judgments and the outcomes. For
example, if a well-calibrated forecaster repeatedly reports forecasts of 60%, then 60% of
those events should occur. Erev et al. (1994) showed that one’s conclusions about
calibration can be reversed, depending on whether probability judgments are treated as
response variables or as predictor variables in the analysis. The modeling of probability
judgments conditioned on objective probability of event occurrence is associated with
underconfidence, and the modeling of event outcomes conditioned on probability judgments
is associated with overconfidence. Wallsten (1996) further summarizes the issues and notes
that “The most useful analyses generally will be those that rely on the response
distributions conditional on true or false statements or on objective probabilities” (pp.
225–226).
The models proposed here implicitly condition on event outcomes (which Wallsten
calls “true or false statements”), because our Y ∗ is defined as the probability judgment for
the outcome that occurred. However, the impact of this conditioning on our conclusions is
unclear because we are not characterizing judges’ calibration in an absolute sense (i.e., we
are not characterizing judges as underconfident, overconfident, or well-calibrated). Instead,
we are characterizing judges’ relative forecasting ability, which is partially based on
calibration but also includes aspects of discrimination, noise, and so on. Further, we draw
no conclusions about judges’ absolute ability: the model can tell us, e.g., which judge is
better than all the others, but it does not tell us whether that judge’s forecasts are highly
predictive of the event outcomes. We conjecture that the relative nature of the proposed
model resolves some of the above-noted statistical issues.
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Conclusion
In summary, IRT models of forecasts afford a useful framework for evaluating
forecasters and items in realistic environments. They formalize reseachers’ intuitions about
question difficulty dynamically changing over time and about questions’ discriminations
between forecasters of varying abilities. Further, many model extensions are available that
allow for data analyses that were impossible with other traditional analyses (say, scoring
rules or traditional regression/ANOVA models). These extensions provide avenues for
future research, resulting in a family of models that can potentially handle many dynamic
forecasting situations.
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Table 1
Matrix reflecting mean Spearman correlations (over twenty replications) between training
and test ability estimates (Brier scores, standardized Brier scores, and IRT estimates).
Interquartile ranges are displayed in parentheses.
Train Brier Train Std Brier Train IRT
Test Brier 0.48 (0.36–0.56)
Test Std Brier 0.59 (0.47–0.7)
Test IRT 0.73 (0.67–0.79)
IRT OF PROBABILITIES 39
Figure 1 . Observed forecasts (probit transformed) vs out-of-sample model predictions.
Predictions are based on item effects only (left panel), forecaster effects only (middle
panel), and the dynamic IRT model (right panel).
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Figure 2 . Out-of-sample model residuals by item (left panel) and forecaster (right panel).
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Figure 3 . Model-based ability estimates versus mean Brier scores.
IRT OF PROBABILITIES 42
Figure 4 . Comparison of best-ranking forecasters, as determined by average Brier score
and by the model. Each panel corresponds to one of the points in Figure 3 (see panel
labels). Light-colored points represent forecasts that were made closer to event resolution.
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Figure 5 . Predicted effects of time on item difficulty, where time is measured by days to
resolution (numbers closer to 0 are closer to resolution). Lines depict three different
randomly-chosen items.
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Figure 6 . Scatterplots between item parameters and surprise ratings. The γ1 parameter is
related to item easiness at resolution, the α parameter is item discrimination, and the ψ
parameter is item residual variability. Pearson correlations are displayed in the upper
triangle.
IRT OF PROBABILITIES 45
Figure 7 . Comparison of forecaster ability estimates from the “continuous forecast” model
and from the ordinal model.
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